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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of a change in a small but time-
varying “disaster risk” à la Gourio (2012) in a New Keynesian model.
In a real business cycle framework, the disaster risk has been successful
in replicating observed moments of equity premia. However, responses
of macroeconomic variables critically depend on the value of the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). In particular, we show here
that an increase in the probability of disaster causes a recession only
in case of an EIS larger than unity, which may be arbitrarily large.
Nevertheless, we also find that incorporating sticky prices allows to
conciliate recessionary effects of the disaster risk with a plausible value
of the EIS. A higher disaster risk is then also associated with an in-
crease in the discount factor and with deflation, making it consistent
with the preference shock literature (Christiano et al., 2011).
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1 Introduction
In the recent years, interest in the economic impact of ‘rare events’ has been
renewed. In particular, Gabaix (2011, 2012) and Gourio (2012) have intro-
duced in real business cycle models a small but time-varying probability of
‘disaster’, defined as an event that destroys a large share of the existing cap-
ital stock. The key feature is that an increase in the probability of disaster,
without occurrence of the disaster itself, suffices to trigger a recession and
replicate some asset pricing regularities.
However, these effects crucially rely on the assumption of an intertem-
poral elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) being greater than unity.
In Gourio (2012), an unexpected increase in the probability of disaster is
equivalent, under some assumptions, to a decrease in agents’ discount fac-
tor, i.e a lower degree of patience. Agents then save and invest less in the
risky capital and instead choose to increase their current consumption. In
the RBC economy, this in turn causes a recession and an increase in risk
premia. However, this initial response of the discount factor holds only un-
der the assumption of an EIS larger than unity. Indeed, as shown by Leland
(1968) and Sandmo (1970), an increase in interest rate risk leads agents to
reduce their savings if and only if the EIS is larger than 1. This is because
a large EIS increases the propensity to consume. On the contrary, when the
EIS is low, income effects overcome substitution effects and savings go up.1
In other words, Gourio (2012)’s disaster shock predictions would not hold
should the parameter value chosen for the EIS be smaller than 1. Indeed,
savings would then increase, surprisingly driving the economy into a boom.
The empirical evidence on the EIS is quite mixed, yet mostly supports a value
below one.2 Macroeconomic models have thus largely adopted this range in
their calibration, whether they feature Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences or not.3
This paper introduces a small time-varying probability of disaster à la
1Weil (1990) shows that a large EIS implies that the elasticity of savings to a ‘certainty-
equivalent’ interest rate is positive, i.e savings decrease in the aggregate interest rate risk.
On the contrary, a small EIS implies that savings go up with interest rate risk.
2The seminal paper by Hall (1988) finds it close to zero and the subsequent literature
has often supported values smaller than one. Heterogeneity across agents matters as rich
households and stockholders tend to have an EIS larger than other agents (Mankiw and
Zeldes (1991), Blundell et al. (1994), Attanasio and Browning, (1995), Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002)). A recent meta-analysis by Havránek et al. (2015) gives a mean estimate of 0.5.
3As for a few examples, Piazzesi et al. (2007) use a value of 0.2, Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012) 0.5, Smets and Wouters (2007) 0.66.
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Gourio (2012) into a New Keynesian model. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to do so. The contribution is threefold. First, we aim at
shedding some light on the critical role of the EIS in driving the disaster
risk results. In particular, Gourio (2012)’s mechanisms generate a boom
with an EIS taking a plausible value. Here, we are able to nest these results
in our decentralized economy with flexible prices. Second, we show that
introducing sticky prices provide a solution to restore and generalize Gourio
(2012)’s predictions for the disaster risk when the EIS is below unity. This
way, we obtain recessionary effects of the disaster risk shock when the low EIS
is at play. Third, we show that the variations in the discount factor caused
by the disaster risk shock can thus be conciliated with the preference shock
literature (Smets and Wouters, 2003, Christiano et al., 2011). In the latter,
exogenous increases in the discount factor cause recession and deflation.
Developing a full-fleshed New Keynesian model is critical here, not just in
order to create a richer macroeconomic setting and broaden the spectrum of
potential policy analysis, but because it literally inverts most of the macroe-
conomic effects associated with a change in the disaster risk, for a given EIS.
The reason for that is particularly intuitive. Consider for instance a low
EIS, in which case the discount factor goes up with the probability of disas-
ter, such that agents do choose to save more. In a flexible price setup, the
economy is mostly driven by this supply-side effect: savings and therefore
investment increase due to precautionary motives, as well as does the labor
supply, such that the economy enters a boom. In contrast, sticky prices make
the output fluctuations more sensitive to the demand-side effect of the shock:
more savings imply lower current consumption, and thus a recession. Hence,
the New Keynesian structure totally changes the macroeconomic dynamics
caused by the disaster risk shock for a given value of the EIS.4 Another inter-
esting finding is that the depressed consumption, stemming from the rise in
disaster risk in the sticky prices version only, also causes deflation and lowers
firms’ demand for production factors (and thus a downside effect on wages),
along with the recession and a rise in the risk premium. This seems to be
4In the same spirit, Basu and Bundick (2014) consider a volatility shock to the discount
factor and also show that the New Keynesian structure changes qualitatively the responses
of the macroeconomic variables compared to RBC setups. Yet, they focus on a second-
moment preference shock from an exogenous discount factor, while we study shifts in the
level of the discount factor capturing changes in the disaster risk, à la Gourio (2012).
Moreover, in their case, the value of the EIS is not critical, while it is in ours.
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particularly consistent with the literature on preference shocks, recently re-
vived as a potential source of zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (e.g
Christiano et al., 2011).
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 gives the calibration values and discusses the steady-state, in par-
ticular whether Tallarini (2000)’s “observational equivalence” holds or not
when the disaster risk is present in the economy. Section 4 shows the re-
sponses to an unexpected increase in the disaster risk. Gourio (2012)’s results
are nested when prices are flexible and the EIS is larger than 1, while re-
versed when the EIS is smaller than 1. Then, with sticky prices and an EIS
smaller than 1, we find that the disaster risk causes a recession, deflation, and
increase in the risk premium in particular. Section 5 reviews the literature
and further discusses the soundness of our results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Households
2.1.1 The household problem with disasters
Let us consider households with Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences given by
V˜t =
[
[Ct (1− Lt)
̟]1−ψ + β0
(
EtV˜
1−γ
t+1
) 1−ψ
1−γ
] 1
1−ψ
where C is consumption, L labor supply, γ the coefficient of risk aversion,
and 1/[1− (1+̟)(1−ψ)] the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS).
Households invest in capital, with a law of accumulation given by
Kt+1 =
[
(1− δ0u
η
t )Kt + S
(
It
Kt
)
Kt
]
ext+1 ln(1−∆)
where x is an indicator variable capturing the occurrence of a “disaster”
destroying a large share of the existing capital stock. Specifically, there
is a time-varying probability θt that a disaster occurs in the next period,
xt+1 = 1, in which case a share∆ of capital is destroyed. Otherwise, xt+1 = 0
and the capital accumulation is in line with standard New Keynesian models,
with a variable utilization rate of capital, u, and a convex capital adjustment
cost function, S(.), with specific forms given further below. Moreover, the
4
probability of disaster, θ, follows a first-order autoregressive process as
log θt = (1− ρθ) log θ¯ + ρθ log θt−1 + σθ,tεθt
where θ¯ is the mean disaster risk, ρθ the persistence, and εθ i.i.d innovations.
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In addition, households can buy one-period bonds issued by a public
authority. As Gabaix (2012) and Gourio (2013), we assume that bonds
are also subject to the disaster risk. Sovereign debt can indeed be risky
during tail events in the sense that it becomes subject to partial default,
as we have observed for Greece in the last financial crisis, Argentina in the
early 2000s, or UK and US in the Great Depression, as for a few examples.
Conditional on no disaster, bonds are however riskfree, unlike capital. It is
worth mentioning that, following Gourio (2012)’s approach, we assume that
the destruction share in case of a disaster, ∆, is the same for the assets (both
capital and bonds here) and productivity. Although this may appear as a
strong assumption, this is essentially a trick used to solve the model with
perturbation methods: when detrended by productivity, the system will then
not be directly impacted by the large disaster event (x) itself but only by
the small probability of disaster (θ), which is our variable of interest.6
Finally, households rent their capital and labor force to monopolistic
competition firms. They own these firms, hence earn profits. They pay
lump-sum taxes to the public authority. Thus, their budget constraint is
Ct + It +
Bt+1
pt
+ Tt ≤
Wt
pt
Lt +
Bt(1 + rt−1)
pt
ext+1 ln(1−∆) +
P kt
pt
utKt +Dt
whereW denotes the (nominal) wage rate, p the good price, B the bonds and
r the corresponding interest rate, P kt is the (nominal) rental rate of capital,
u the utilization rate of capital, I the investment, T the taxes, and D the
(real) dividends from monopolistic firms’ (real) profits.
The households want to maximize utility subject to their capital accumu-
lation and the budget constraints. However, because the indicator variable is
present in this optimization problem and thus in the equilibrium condition,
5These parameters will be calibrated following empirical estimations of disaster risk
(see Section 3). Our qualitative results yet hold also without any degree of persistence.
6It is possible to release this constraint by using projection methods to solve the model,
as Gourio (2012) also does with a smaller set of variables. Another alternative would be
to make an assumption on whether the economy is currently in a disaster state, x = 1, or
not x = 0, when generating the impulse response functions for the disaster risk, θ.
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we cannot directly use the perturbation methods to solve the model as such.
Therefore, we follow Gourio (2012) in detrending the system such that the
disaster risk only, and not the disaster event, impacts the detrended system.
2.1.2 Detrending the household’s problem
Let us thus assume, as in Gabaix (2012) and Gourio (2012), that productiv-
ity, denoted z, is also partly destroyed in case of a disaster, and follows
zt+1
zt
= eµ+εz,t+1+xt+1 ln(1−∆)
where µ is a trend and εz,t+1 i.i.d normally distributed innovations with zero
mean.7 As mentioned above, assuming that the share ∆ is the same as for
the physical assets, the detrended variables will not depend on the disaster
event anymore, but will still be affected by the disaster risk. In particular,
the household’s budget constraint in detrended terms reads as
ct + it +
bt+1
pt
eµ+εz,t+1 +
Tt
zt
≤
wt
pt
Lt +
bt(1 + rt−1)
pt
+
P kt
pt
utkt +
Dt
zt
(1)
while the capital accumulation becomes
kt+1 =
(1− δt)kt + S
(
it
kt
)
kt
eµ+εz,t+1
(2)
where lower case letters denote the detrended variables (kt = Kt/zt, etc), and
where, in line with the New Keynesian literature, the capital depreciation
rate is considered as a function of the capital utilization rate
δt = δ0u
η
t (3)
while the capital adjustment cost function, with usual properties, reads as
S
(
it
kt
)
=
it
kt
−
τ
2
(
it
kt
−
i¯
k¯
)2
(4)
7Labor productivity may indeed decrease during financial crises (e.g Hughes and Sale-
heen, 2012), as well as during wars or natural disasters as people may find themselves
not necessarily matched with jobs requiring their specific skills. Total factor productiv-
ity may also decrease as firms facing severe financing constraints may reduce their R&D
expenditures (Millard and Nicolae, 2014).
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Note that indeed, the disaster indicator xt+1 finds itself canceled out from
this part of the model. Then, as far as objective function is concerned, let
us define vt =
Vt
z1−ψt
, with V˜t = V
1
1−ψ
t , such that we get
vt = [ct(1− Lt)
̟]1−ψ + β(θt)e
(1−ψ)µ
[
Ete
(1−γ)εz,t+1v1−χt+1
] 1
1−χ
(5)
where χ = 1− 1−γ1−ψ is a combination of parameters, and where the discount
factor becomes a function of the time-varying disaster risk as given by
β(θ) = β0
[
1− θt + θte
(1−γ) ln(1−∆)
] 1−ψ
1−γ
(6)
which is similar to Gourio (2012)’s expression.8 The households will thus
maximize (5) subject to (1)-(4) and (6).9
The beauty of Gourio (2012)’s detrending approach is that the disaster
risk, θ, affects in fine the macroeconomic quantities and asset prices through
changes in the discount factor only. In that respect, an unexpected change
in the disaster risk is expected to generate the same effects as exogenous
preference shocks à la Smets and Wouters (2003) or Christiano et al. (2011).
A closer look at the expression (6) above makes it clear that the value of the
EIS determines the sign of the effect of the probability of disaster (θ) on the
discount factor, and thus agents’ propensity to save or consume in response
to such a shock. In particular, agents become more patient (higher β(θ))
whenever the EIS is below unity, and on the contrary, more impatient (lower
β(θ)) for all values of the EIS larger than unity. Note that this holds for all
degrees of risk aversion, including risk neutrality.10 In the specific case where
the EIS is exactly equal to unity, β(θ) boils down to β0, i.e the probability
of disaster does not have any impact on the macroeconomic quantities, but
only on asset pricing. Thus, here as in Gourio (2012), the so-called ‘Tallarini
(2000)’s equivalence’, i.e the quantities being determined irrespectively of
the level of aggregate risk or risk aversion, holds if and only if EIS = 1.
8Gourio (2012) also makes the size of the disaster, ∆, a random variable. We consider
it constant here for the sake of simplicity, but could easily introduce this feature as well.
9The first-order conditions and calculation details are provided in Appendix.
10Rewriting (6) as β(θ) = β0
[
1− θt
(
1− e(1−γ) ln(1−∆)
)] 1−1/EIS
(1−γ)(1+̟)
and taking the
derivative with respect to θ, it is the case that ∂β(θ)/∂θ is positive (respectively, neg-
ative) for any EIS smaller (respectively larger) than one. This holds for all degrees of risk
aversion (including risk neutrality), i.e ∀γ ≥ 0. See more about this in Appendix.
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In the partial equilibrium built so far, the sign of the preference shift in
response to the disaster risk shock suffices to determine the sign of the output
variation: an increase in the probability of disaster causes a recession when
the EIS is larger than one, a boom otherwise. Intuitively, higher impatience
makes agents save less, thus invest less, such that the output falls. Yet, an
EIS smaller than unity is empirically sound, and it seems surprising that
disaster risk is positively correlated with output in that case. This is the
puzzle we solve here in general equilibrium by introducing sticky prices.
The nominal rigidity does not alter the relationship between the value of
the EIS and the sign of the preference shift discussed above. However, it
makes output respond primarily to consumption rather than savings, and
thus allows to conciliate recessionary effects of the disaster risk with an EIS
lower than unity.11
2.1.3 The stochastic discount factor
The (real) stochastic discount factor is defined under Epstein-Zin preferences
as Qt,t+1 ≡
∂V˜t/∂Ct+1
∂V˜t/∂Ct
. For the non detrended model, this gives us
Qt,t+1 = β0
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
−ψ (1− Lt+1
1− Lt
)̟(1−ψ) V −χt+1
(EtV
1−χ
t+1 )
−χ
1−χ
which is identical to Gourio (2012)’s, and from the detrended terms
Qt,t+1 =
zt
zt+1
(
ct+1
ct
)
−ψ (
1− Lt+1
1− Lt
)̟(1−ψ)
β(θt)e
(1−ψ)µ e
(1−γ)εz,t+1v−χt+1[
Ete(1−γ)εz,t+1v
1−χ
t+1
] −χ
1−χ
Since the disaster event (x) is present within the productivity growth term
here, we also need to define a “detrended” stochastic discount factor as
Q˜t,t+1 ≡
zt+1
zt
Qt,t+1 that we can use, together with the first-order condition
on bonds so as to solve for the macroeconomic quantities
EtQ˜t,t+1 = Et
(
1 + πt+1
1 + rt
eµ+εz,t+1
)
(7)
11It can be the case that some other model specifications allow for the same results. In
particular, a real business cycle model with price determinacy for some periods or a simpler
New Keynesian model without capital could potentially reach the same conclusions.
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For determining the asset prices in the following subsection, we however still
use the proper stochastic discount factor as given by
EtQt,t+1 = Et
(
1 + πt+1
1 + rt
1
ext+1 ln(1−∆)
)
(8)
2.1.4 The risk premium
From asset pricing orthogonality condition we can define the following rates
(i) The riskfree rate, Rf , is obtained from
Et
[
Qt,t+1R
f
t+1
]
= 1
Note that this is not the yield on bonds, which are only riskfree conditional
on no disaster here, but rather a “natural” (gross) interest rate.
(ii) the (real) rate of return on capital Rk,realt+1 , from Et
[
Qt,t+1R
k,real
t+1
]
= 1,
which can be rewritten, replacing Qt,t+1 from equation (8), as
Rk,realt+1 =
zt+1
zt
1
eµ+εz,t+1
1 + rt
1 + πt+1
= ext+1 ln(1−∆)
1 + rt
1 + πt+1
Using the first-order condition on capital and non-detrended terms, we get
Rk,realt+1 = e
xt+1 ln(1−∆)
{
P kt+1
pt+1
ut+1
qt
+
qt+1
qt
[
1− δ0u
η
t+1 + τ
it+1
kt+1
(
it+1
kt+1
−
i¯
k¯
)
−
τ
2
(
it+1
kt+1
−
i¯
k¯
)2]}
which reminds both Gourio (2012)’s centralized economy version, as the
disaster event directly affects the return on capital, and the expression in
DSGE models in the absence of disaster risk (e.g Benigno and Paciello, 2014).
(iii) The risk premium of holding capital is defined, in gross terms, as the
ratio of the real return on capital (ii) to the riskfree rate (i), i.e
Et(Risk premiumt+1) ≡ Et(R
k,real
t+1 /R
f
t+1)
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Note that the risk premium is nil in a first-order approximation, constant in
the second order, and time-varying in the third and higher orders.
The value of the EIS has a partial equilibrium effect on the responses of
these asset returns to the disaster risk shock. In order to better understand
it, let us have a look at the expression of these asset returns in the balanced
growth path of our economy. First, the stochastic discount factor is
Q(x′) = β0
e−ψµ−γx
′ ln(1−∆)(
Ee(1−γ)x′ ln(1−∆)
)ψ−γ
1−γ
which is a function of the disaster state, x. From the orthogonality condition
E(M(x′)Rk(x′)) = 1, the return on capital is
E(Rk(x′)) =
E(ex
′ ln(1−∆))
β0e−ψµ
(
Ee(1−γ)x′ ln(1−∆)
) 1−ψ
1−γ
while the riskfree rate is
Rf =
(
Ee(1−γ)x
′ ln(1−∆)
)ψ−γ
1−γ
β0e−ψµE
(
e−γx′ ln(1−∆)
)
Note that the riskfree rate decreases in the disaster risk (along the balanced
growth path), and the smaller the EIS, the larger the drop.12 This results
is well known in the literature and often justifies the need for a use of an
EIS larger than unity in order to limit the fall in the riskfree rate (Tsai and
Watcher (2015).13 However, in our general equilibrium setup, the nominal
rigidity modifies the effect of the EIS: the drop in the riskfree rate is then
larger when the EIS is above unity. Asset pricing effects of the disaster risk
can thus be restored with an EIS smaller than unity.
Finally, the risk premium along the balanced growth path is given by
12See the Appendix for calculation details.
13An increase in disaster risk directly reduces the price of equities as it lowers expected
cash flows. But meanwhile, it causes an increase in precautionary savings which diminishes
the risk-free rate, and in turn tends to increase the price of equities by increasing demand
relatively to the supply of equities. Whether this latter effect offsets the former depends on
the value of EIS. Indeed, the smaller the EIS, the larger the precautionary savings and the
drop in the risk free rate. For example, Berkman et al. (2011) show that the probability
of disasters, defined as political crises, is negatively correlated with stock prices. Evidence
of this kind encouraged the asset pricing literature to adopt an EIS larger than one.
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E(Rk(x′))
Rf
=
E(ex
′ ln(1−∆))E(e−γx
′ ln(1−∆))
E
(
e(1−γ)x′ ln(1−∆)
)
As expected, the risk premium depends positively on the disaster risk, and
the larger the risk aversion, the larger the effect. If agents were risk neutral,
i.e when γ = 0, the risk premium is unaffected by changes in the probability
of disaster. Note that the EIS does not directly impact the value of the
risk premium along the balanced growth path, in line with Gourio (2012).14
However, in the general equilibrium, the EIS will affect the responses of the
risk premium to the disaster risk shock (See Section 4).
2.2 Firms
The structure of production considered here is quite standard as for a New
Keynesian model. However, it plays crucial role for our results: unlike Gourio
(2012)’s centralized economy flexible-price model, the decentralized economy
featuring monopolistic competition and sticky prices allows to obtain reces-
sionary effects from a disaster risk shock when the EIS is smaller than unity.
The nominal price friction makes the reponse of output affected mostly by
the demand side (consumption) rather than the supply side (savings) of the
economy. Thus, the drop in consumption associated with a rise in disaster
risk when the EIS is below unity will generate here recession and deflation.
Firms are operating in two sectors, final good production and intermedi-
ate good production. The former market is competitive, while the latter is
monopolistic. They are briefly described below, see Appendix for details.
2.2.1 Final good production
The final good is an aggregate of intermediate goods j as given by
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
ν−1
ν
j,t dj
) ν
ν−1
where ν is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods. Profit
maximization gives a demand curve which is decreasing in the price of inter-
mediate good j relative to the aggregate price index (pj,t/pt) as
14Gourio (2012) finds the same expression for the risk premium along the balanced
growth path (Proposition 5). However, general equilibrium effects will differ here.
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Yj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)
−ν
Yt
2.2.2 Intermediate sector
Intermediate sector firms use households’ capital and labor to produce goods
j, according to a Cobb-Douglas function with labor-augmenting productiv-
ity. In each period, they optimize the quantities of factors they want to use,
taking their prices as given, subject to the production function and the aggre-
gate demand function at a given output price. With frequency determined
by a constant Calvo probability, they also set their price optimally.
The intra-temporal problem (cost minimization problem) is thus
min
Lj,t,K˜j,t
WtLj,t + P
k
t K˜j,t
s.t. K˜αj,t(ztLj,t)
1−α ≥
(
pj,t
pt
)
−ν
Yt
where W nomt is the (non-detrended) nominal wage rate and P
k
t the capital
rental rate. The first-order conditions, expressed in detrended terms, are
(Lj,t :) wt = mc
nom
j,t (1− α)
(
k˜j,t
Lj,t
)α
(K˜j,t :) P
k
t = mc
nom
j,t α
(
k˜j,t
Lj,t
)α−1
in which the Lagrange multiplier denoted mcnomj,t can be interpreted as the
(nominal) marginal cost associated with an additional unit of capital or
labor. Rearranging further gives an optimal capital to labor ratio which is
the same for all intermediate firms in equilibrium.
Let’s now consider the inter-temporal problem of a firm that gets to up-
date its price in period t and wants to maximize the present-discounted value
of future profits. Given the (real) profit flows that read as
pj,t
pt
Yj,t −mc
∗
tYj,t
and the demand function Yj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)
−ν
Yt, the maximization problem is
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max
pj,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζ)sQt+s
((
pj,t
pt+s
)1−ν
Yt+s −mc
∗
t+s
(
pj,t
pt+s
)
−ν
Yt+s
)
where discounting includes both households’ stochastic discount factor, Qt,t+s,
and the probability ζs that a price chosen at time t is still in effect at time
s. After some simplification, the first-order condition is
p∗j,t =
ν
ν − 1
Et
∑
∞
s=0 (ζ)
sQt+sp
ν
t+sYt+smc
∗
t+s∑
∞
s=0 (ζ)
sQt+sp
ν−1
t+s Yt+s
which depends on aggregate variables only, so that p∗t = p
∗
j,t. Increases in
this optimal price from one period to another will give us the reset inflation
rate while increases in the current price level pt defines the current inflation
rate. (see Appendix for more details.)
2.3 Public authority
Bonds clears with public debt issued by a public authority which raises taxes
from the households. The public authority also sets up the nominal interest
rate on bonds following a Taylor type rule as
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr) [Φπ(πt − π¯) + ΦY (yt − y
∗) + r∗] (9)
2.4 Equilibrium
The optimality conditions for the three representative agents’ problem de-
scribed above are derived in Appendix. They are solved together with the
aggregate constraints also described in Appendix.
3 Calibration and steady-state analysis
Table 1 summarizes our main calibration values. We follow the literature
estimating disasters on historical data. In particular Barro and Ursúa (2008)
estimated that the size of disasters is 22% while the probability of such events
is 0,9% quarterly.15 Following Gourio (2012), we consider a persistence of 0.9.
15Evidence on disasters’ size and frequency is quite mixed and highly dependent on the
methods used for the estimastion. We take Barro and Ursúa (2008)’s values which seem
to be in the middle of the range of other studies. Barro (2006) have larger disasters (43%)
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We also consider alternative values in Section 4.2 and find similar patterns,
suggesting that the sign of the responses of interest is quite robust to lower
degree of persistence in disaster risk, only the size of the responses differs.
Since our utility function is identical to Gourio (2012), we use the same
valuation of leisure (̟ = 2.33) and risk aversion coefficient (γ = 3.8). In
Section 4.2, we test alternative values of the risk aversion parameter, which
is however constrained numerically by the fact that the endogenous discount
factor β(θ) should be kept below one for solving the model.
All the other values are in line with the New Keynesian literature, in
particular parameters entering the production function, the capital accumu-
lation, and the Taylor-type rule are conventional. We compare the standard
value for the Calvo probability of firms not changing their price (ζ = 0.8) to
a purely flexible price case with ζ = 0, for two different values of the EIS,
either 0.5 (as a plausible value) or 2 (as in Gourio, 2012). Here as well, we
try intermediate degrees of price stickiness in Section 4.2.
Table 2 shows the steady-state values obtained under our calibration
for some selected variables. In particular, we compare the economy without
disaster, i.e having either a probability of disaster (θ) or a size of disaster (∆)
equal to zero, to the economy with disaster (for two example sizes, ∆ = 0.22
and ∆ = 0.40). This is reported here for three different cases: flexible prices
(ζ = 0) and EIS = 2 (economy à la Gourio), flexible prices and EIS = 0.5,
sticky prices (ζ = 0.8) and EIS = 0.5 (baseline scenario).
The role of the EIS is particularly worth discussing here. In the economy
with an EIS below 1, agents have a high propensity to consume the certainty-
equivalent income (see Weil (1990)). Thus, steady-state consumption has to
be lower in the economy with disaster risk than the economy without. Intu-
itively, one can think that agents make precautionary savings if they expect
a potential disaster to arrive. The same reasoning holds for providing more
labor and capital initially in an economy that will be potentially affected
by a disaster. Thus current output is higher. One can also see this higher
‘degree of patience’ in the (time-varying) discount factor and the stochastic
discount factor. This holds whether prices are flexible or sticky.
On the contrary, with an EIS larger than 1, agents do not make so much
precautionary savings and precautionary labor supply. Thus investment and
with a probability of 0,72% quarterly, whereas Gourio (2013) have smaller disasters (15%)
with a probability of 0,5% quarterly.
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Table 1: Baseline calibration values (quarterly)
Disaster risk
θ¯ disaster risk 0.009
∆ disaster size 0.22
ρθ disaster risk persistence 0.9
Utility function
β0 discount factor 0.99
1/ψ˜ elasticity of intertemporal subtitution 0.5
γ risk aversion coefficient 3.8
̟ leisure preference 2.33
Investment
δ0 capital depreciation rate 0.02
τ investment adjustment costs 1.7
u¯ utilization rate of capital 1
Production
α capital share of production 0.33
ζ0 Calvo probability 0.8
ν elasticity of substitution among goods 6
µ trend growth of productivity 0.005
Public authority
ψπ Taylor rule inflation weight 1.5
ψY Taylor rule output weight 0.5
π¯ target inflation rate 0.005
ρr interest rate smoothing parameter 0.85
output are lower, and by wealth effect so is consumption, when disaster risk
is present in the economy versus not. Note that in both cases, the return on
capital is of course decreasing in disaster risk. As one can also expect, the
risk premium is nil in all cases as the agents make financial arbitrage with
perfect foresight at the steady-state. The Tobin’s q remains unchanged since
the disaster risk does not affect directly the macroeconomic quantities of the
detrended system, unlike a capital depreciation shock for instance.
Only in case when the EIS tends to unity, steady-state values tend to be
equal in economies with and without disaster risk. Indeed, when the EIS is
equal to 1, the time-varying discount factor (β(θ)) boils down to the usual
discount factor β0 (in equation (6)), and the disaster risk does not affect the
economic outcomes anymore. This results is referred to as Tallarini (2000)’s
“observational equivalence”, stating that the macroeconomic quantities are
unaffected by the amount of risk in the economy. Again, here as in Gourio
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no disaster risk baseline disaster risk large disaster risk
∆ = 0.22 and θ → 0 ∆ = 0.22 ∆ = 0.4
or ∆ = 0 and θ = 0.9% θ = 0.9% θ = 0.9%
EIS = 0.5, sticky prices (ζ = 0.8)
output (detrended) 0.614 0.625 0.651
consumption (detrended) 0.499 0.505 0.518
investment (detrended) 0.115 0.121 0.133
labor 0.228 0.229 0.232
capital (detrended) 4.608 4.820 5.332
β(θ) 0.990 0.991 0.993
Tobin’s q 1 1 1
wage 1.505 1.525 1.570
capital rental rate 0.037 0.036 0.034
stochastic discount factor 0.984 0.986 0.990
return on capital 1.017 1.014 1.010
risk premium 1 1 1
EIS = 0.5, flexible prices (ζ = 0)
output (detrended) 0.614 0.626 0.652
consumption (detrended) 0.499 0.505 0.518
investment (detrended) 0.115 0.120 0.133
labor 0.228 0.229 0.232
capital (detrended) 4.604 4.818 5.333
β(θ) 0.990 0.991 0.993
Tobin’s q 1 1 1
wage 1.506 1.526 1.572
capital rental rate 0.037 0.036 0.034
stochastic discount factor 0.984 0.986 0.990
return on capital 1.017 1.014 1.010
risk premium 1 1 1
EIS = 2, flexible prices (ζ = 0)
output (detrended) 0.642 0.635 0.623
consumption (detrended) 0.513 0.510 0.504
investment (detrended) 0.128 0.125 0.119
labor 0.230 0.230 0.229
capital (detrended) 5.129 5.008 4.766
β(θ) 0.990 0.990 0.989
Tobin’s q 1 1 1
wage 1.554 1.543 1.521
capital rental rate 0.034 0.035 0.036
stochastic discount factor 0.986 0.987 0.988
return on capital 1.014 1.013 1.012
risk premium 1 1 1
Table 2: Steady-state values
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(2012), this holds if and only if the EIS is equal to one. In all other cases,
quantities differ from the economy without disaster risk.
4 Impulse Response Functions
In this Section, we simulate the effect of a rise in the small probability of
disaster (θ) from the stochastic steady-state. Unless specified, the approxi-
mation is made at the third-order such that asset pricing and macroeconomic
variables interact with each other.16 Our aim here is essentially qualitative,
and consists in comparing the effect of the shock in the following four cases:
(i) With flexible prices and EIS = 2, a decentralized version of Gourio
(2012)’s economy, in order to nest his results as a particular case;
(ii) Still under flexibles prices but with EIS = 0.5, i.e a value more in line
with the standard RBC and New Keynesian literatures and with micro
estimates. Gourio (2012)’s results are then found to be reversed;
(iii) With sticky prices and the same EIS = 0.5, as for our baseline scenario.
The recessionary effect is then restored and generalized;
(iv) With sticky prices and EIS = 2, the mirroring case of (iii).
Since we use perturbation methods here, we consider a very small devi-
ation from the itself very small probability of disaster at the steady-state,
more specifically a change from θ¯ = 0.009 to 0.01. As a consequence, the
size of the responses that we get will naturally be small as well. A larger
shock could of course give a better feel for the magnitude of the effects we are
describing here, yet this would be at the price of potentially large errors.17
In addition, we try some alternative calibration values, and finally simulate
the responses of the model to a standard monetary policy shock. This allows
to check the accuracy of our model in replicating well-known perturbation
responses in spite of the presence of disaster risk.
16Indeed, the risk premium is nil in the first-order, constant at the second-order, but
fluctuates in response to the disaster risk shock with a third-order approximation.
17Using projection methods, Gourio (2012) considers a deviation from 0.72% to 4% for
the probability of disaster. His results indicate the magnitude of the effects of a disaster
risk shock, while we mostly focus on the sign of the responses here.
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4.1 Effects of a disaster risk shock: qualitative effects
4.1.1 Case 1: flexible prices and EIS = 2 (à la Gourio, 2012)
Figure 1 shows the effect of the disaster risk shock in an economy à la Gourio
(2012), here in a decentralized market version instead of the RBC model,
with flexible prices (ζ = 0) and an EIS of 2, according to his calibration.
The shock makes the agents more impatient (β(θ) decreases). Hence, they
save and thus invest less, such that the economy enters a recession, while
the risk premium goes up. However, agents then consume more and work
less, so the wage increases. These results are identical to Gourio (2012)’s
and partly consistent with the evidence on disaster risk (see Barro (2006)
or Gourio (2008) for instance). However, these predictions rely on accepting
an EIS greater than 2, which contrasts with commonly accepted values. We
propose to look for the responses with a different EIS in Case 2 below.
4.1.2 Case 2: flexible prices and EIS = 0.5
In this case, we just changed the value of the EIS to 0.5 compared to the
previous case. As one can see on Figure 2, this is enough to make the sign of
most variables completely opposite. Contrary to Case 1, a low EIS implies
that agents’ propensity to save increases with the disaster risk. This is cap-
tured here by an increase in the discount factor, that can be interpreted as a
higher degree of patience. This makes the agents save more and invest more.
The lower consumption on impact does not have much effect on the total
output response. The price of goods drops on impact but rises immediately
after (since there is no price rigidity in this case). Hence firms expect the de-
flation to be short and want to increase their demand for production factors,
as well as the utilization rate of capital. Therefore, the rental rate of capital
goes up, making the households willing to invest more. Overall, the rise in
investment is higher than the drop in consumption, such that the economy
enters a boom. As consumption decreases, the marginal utility increases, so
the labor supply increases and the wage goes down despite the boom.
As far as asset pricing is concerned, we can see here that the risk premium
still goes up because the disaster risk shock makes it more risky to invest in
the capital stock. But, in this case, it implies that the risk premium becomes
procyclical, which is highly counterfactual. Also note that, by making the
EIS smaller, the magnitude of the increase is now larger than in Case 1.
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Figure 1: Responses (in percentage change) to a rise in θ from 0.9% to 1%
(ζ = 0 and EIS = 2).
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Figure 2: Responses (in percentage change) to a rise in θ from 0.9% to 1%
(ζ = 0 and EIS = 0.5).
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4.1.3 Case 3: sticky prices and EIS = 0.5 (baseline scenario)
As in Case 2, a low EIS makes the agents more patient (they have a higher
β(θ)) following the disaster risk shock, which gives them an incentive to save,
and thus to invest more (Figure 3). As before too, consumption drops. How-
ever, the price stickiness makes the relative size of these responses different
from Case 2. Indeed, consumption decreases more than investment increases
here, such that recession and deflation ensue.
Two specific responses are worth being discussed more carefully here,
namely the rise in investment and labor quantity. Both variables are here
subject to a precautionary motive from the households when the disaster
risk goes up. The agents want to limit the decrease in their consumption
by acquiring more capital and increasing their labor supply when a disaster
becomes more likely (under the assumption of an EIS below one). Simul-
taneously, there is also a downward pressure on investment and labor that
stems from firms’ lower demand for production factors. However, in our case,
the former effect overweights the latter, such that the net effect on invest-
ment and labor is positive, for several reasons. First, firms do not control
directly for the level of investment in our model but for the capital utilization
rate, which indeed drops in Figure 3. Hence, investment is mostly driven by
households’ precautionary savings rather than firms’ lower demand for capi-
tal.18 Second, recall that the households cannot buy the riskfree asset in our
economy, such that investment and risky bonds have to go up since they are
the only available vehicles for savings. Thus, the larger the precautionary
motive, the larger the increase in investment.19 Third, it may be the case
that considering nonconvex capital adjustment costs is sufficient to make
the investment decrease while still preserving the sign of our other responses
unchanged, as discussed in Bloom (2009) and here in Section 5.4. Finally,
18Basu and Bundick (2014)’s responses to a volatility shock on the discount factor have
some similarities with our shift in the level of the discount factor caused by the disaster risk
shock. In particular, they also obtain precautionary labor and investment. Yet, because
investment is realized by firms instead of the capital utilization rate as we have here, they
overall find a negative net effect of investment to the shock.
19A way to overcome this effect would be to allow the agents to acquire the riskfree
asset in our economy. However then, the detrending method à la Gourio (2012) could not
be perfectly applied, and we would have to make an assumption about the state of the
economy today being in a ‘disaster’ regime or not when generating the impule response
functions. It would be straightforward to do so, and the approach that we choose here is
just a question of preference for unconditional impulse response functions, closer to the
spirit of Gourio (2012).
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Figure 3: Responses (in percentage change) to a rise in θ from 0.9% to 1%
(ζ = 0.8 and EIS = 0.5).
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whether the increase in supply or the decrease in demand of investment and
labor is the dominant effect is also highly sensitive to the calibration choices
(see Section 4.2). Note finally that both effects contribute here to the drop
in wages, which is not observed in the economy à la Gourio (Case 1).
As for asset prices, we observe a ‘flight-to-quality’ effect that is visible
through the drop in the riskfree rate when the disaster risk shock hits. This
drop in the riskfree rate is of similar magnitude as in Case 1, suggesting
that sticky prices may provide a solution to avoid an excessive change in the
riskfree rate despite having an EIS smaller than one, as discussed before.
Finally, the risk premium also increases here due the disaster risk shock.
When compared to the economy à la Gourio (Case 1), the magnitude of this
increase is lower here. However, moving from an EIS larger than one to
an EIS smaller than one always increases the response of the risk premium
to the disaster risk shock, for a given degree of price stickiness/flexibility
(comparing Cases 1 and 2 on one hand, and Cases 3 and 4 on the other).
Overall, the responses of both macroeconomic quantities and asset prices
to the disaster risk shock in this Case happen to be very similar to those
obtained from exogenous preference shocks in the literature (see e.g Smets
and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. (2011)). They are also reminiscent
of the literature on uncertainty shocks. In particular, in giving a short sharp
recession followed by an “overshooting” in the recovery, as in Bloom (2009).
In that respect, the disaster risk can provide a potential explanation for
exogenous shifts in preferences or changes in aggregate uncertainty.
4.1.4 Case 4: sticky prices and EIS = 2
In this last scenario, we change again the EIS for a value larger than unity,
but still under sticky prices. As we can observe in Figure 4, the same increase
in θ now makes the time-varying discount factor drop again. All the other
responses are thus the exact opposite to those in Figure 3. In particular,
there is a boom (as in Case 2) in output, driven by consumption increase
(unlike Case 2). This Case is not a realistic scenario for a disaster risk shock,
yet it provides an interesting counterfactual exercise to confirm (i) the effect
of the EIS on the discount factor and the propensity to consume/save, and
(ii) the fact that the model with nominal rigidity is driven primarily by the
response in consumption to the disaster risk shock while the flexible-price
version is primarily driven by the supply-side of the economy for a given value
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Figure 4: Responses (in percentage change) to a rise in θ from 0.9% to 1%
(ζ = 0.8 and EIS = 2).
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of the EIS. We can also observe that the riskfree rate happens to decrease
more than in Case 3 where the EIS was low. This implies that the disaster
risk argument about a high value of the EIS being necessary to limit the fall
of the riskfree rate does not hold anymore when prices are sticky.
Figures 5 and 6 summarize together the responses in the economy à la
Gourio (2012) and in our baseline economy in the same graphs, for easier
comparison. This is realized successfully at first-order (Figure 5) and third-
order (Figure 6) approximations.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
We run some sensitivity analysis to alternative calibration values when simu-
lating the effect of our disaster risk shock on the benchmark economy (small
EIS, sticky prices). The responses are given in Figure 7.
The first setup of responses is generated against different values of the risk
aversion coefficient. Here, we can see that for normal values of risk aversion
with Esptein-Zin specification, typically between 3 and 4 (Barro and Jin,
2011), the effects that we describe in Case 3 holds, i.e a recession driven by
the drop in output. For an economy closer to risk neutrality (on Figure 8,
γ = 1.5), the effects essentially remain, except for labor, which decreases.
This is because the upward effect of the ‘precautionary labor supply’ is now
lower than the downward effect of the lower demand of labor from firms
when the disaster becomes more likely. Only for very high values of risk
aversion (here, γ = 6), the response of precautionary savings on investment
by households is so high that it overcomes the drop in consumption and
prevents the recession. Here again, should the households be allowed to buy
the riskfree asset in our model setup, the effect would vanish.
Second, we test for different values of the discount factor that would
hold without disaster risk in the economy, β0. This can be interepreted as a
kind of fundamental degree of patience. This is useful to observe that, with
agents initially less patient than in our standard calibration (β0 = 0.99), the
drop in consumption is mitigated while investment also now drops on im-
pact (the precautionary motive for investment turns to be small). Actually,
in that case, the downward effect of investment, stemming from a higher
chance of destruction of capital by a disaster, overweights the precautionary
motive, such that investment decreases on impact, and subsequently limits
the overshooting in output following the recession.
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Third, we run experiments for the parameters relative to the disaster
risk. When the steady-state probability of disaster is tried against alternative
values, the qualitative effects are unchanged, except for the labor. Indeed, for
a lower probability of disaster, the lower demand effect overweights the higher
supply effect, such that the net quantity of labor decreases. The same idea
holds for changes of the size of the disaster. Only for large disasters (30%),
the precautionary motive is so important that, given agent’s incapability
to buy the riskfree asset here, investment rises so much that it drives the
economy into a boom. To finish with, the persistence of the disaster risk just
mitigates the effects but leaves the qualitative responses unchanged.
Finally, Figure 8 shows the responses to a standard monetary policy shock
for the baseline scenario. These responses are quite standard and inform us
about the validity of the model to conventional shocks.
5 Discussion
5.1 The literature on disaster risk
The literature on rare events has emerged in the 1980s when macroeconomic
models were struggling to explain the dynamics of asset prices and their re-
lated risk premia. Rietz (1988) has shown that introducing a low probability
of an economic disaster into an endowment economy was able to address the
the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985).20
Estimating economic disasters on US data over the twentieth century,
Barro (2006) found a frequency of 1.7% per year and an average size of 29%.
Using these results to calibrate an extended version of Rietz (1988)’s model,
Barro confirmed that rare disasters could capture high equity premium and
low risk-free rate puzzles. Barro and Ursúa (2008) have further extended
Barro (2006) by including data on consumption, more relevant for asset
pricing models. They assembled international time series since 1870 and
found disaster probabilities of around 3.6% per year with a mean disaster
20Other solutions that have been proved able to improve asset pricing of macroeconomic
models include notably consumption habits and heteroscedastic shocks (Campbell and
Cochrane, 1999) and Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences, separating the risk aversion coefficient
from the EIS, combined with stochastic volatility in consumption growth (Bansal and
Yaron, 2004). Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences alone contribute only partially to the solution
of the equity premium puzzle: in Weil (1989) for instance the risk aversion coefficient must
be set at 45 and EIS at 0.1 for a reasonable match with the data to be obtained.
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size of 22%. They simulate a Lucas-tree model with i.i.d. growth shocks
and Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences and obtain plausible equity premium on
levered equity, with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3.5.21
Despite encouraging results, Rietz (1988), Barro (2006) and Barro and
Ursúa (2008)’s models were not able to explain some asset pricing moments
such as the volatility of price-dividend ratios for stocks, the volatility of bond
risk premia, and return predictability.22 This is essentially due to the fact
that they assume the probability of disaster to be constant. Thus, Gabaix
(2008) made it time-varying and introduced it in an endowment economy,
before Gabaix (2011, 2012) and Gourio (2012, 2013) further considered real
business cycle frameworks. A time-varying probability of disaster is indeed
able to explain volatility patterns of asset prices and return predictabil-
ity (Wachter, 2013, Seo and Wachter, 2013). It also solves a number of
macro-finance puzzles such as the risk-free rate puzzle or the upward-sloping
nominal yield curve (Gabaix, 2012).
Gabaix’s (2012) framework is constructed such that variations in the
probability of disaster have no impact on macroeconomic quantities. This
is reminiscent of Tallarini (2000)’s theorem that macroeconomic dynamics,
unlike asset prices, are basically unaffected by changes in aggregate risk. In
contrast, Gourio (2012) found that Tallarini (2000)’s “observational equiva-
lence” holds for the presence of disaster risk if and only if the EIS is exactly
equal to unity. However, he shows that, as soon as the EIS differs from unity,
a shock to the probability of disaster is equivalent, under some assumptions,
to a preference shock. His model thus predicts a correlation between asset
prices and macroeconomic quantities which is supported empirically.
We here build on Gourio (2012)’s modeling of the disaster risk and in-
corporate it into a full-fleshed New Keynesian model, featuring monopolistic
competition, capital adjustment costs, sticky prices, and a Taylor-type rule.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper to do so. Thereby, we
show that Gourio (2012)’s results can be conciliated with a value of the EIS
smaller than unity, and thus generalize them in a framework more suitable
for future policy analysis.
21Barro and Jin (2011) estimate the risk aversion coefficient from dataset on disasters.
They found a mean close to 3, with a 95% confidence interval for values from 2 to 4.
22In Barro and Ursúa (2008), the price-dividend ratio and the risk-free rate are constant.
27
5.2 Evidence and calibration of the EIS
There is no clear consensus about the value of EIS in the literature. It is
standard in macroeconomic calibrations to take a value smaller than one,
whether the utility function is Epstein-Zin and thus the EIS chosen indepen-
dently from the risk aversion coefficient (Rudebusch and Swanson (2012),
Caldara et al. (2012), use both a value of 0.5) or with standard time-additive
preferences (Piazzesi et al. (2007) choose 0.2, Smets and Wouters (2007)
0.66). In contrast, macrofinance real business cycles often choose a value
higher than unity to match asset pricing moments (Barro and Ursúa (2008),
Gourio (2012) and Nakamura et al. (2012) use a value of 2).
This dispersion is due to the fact that empirical evidence on the value of
the EIS is yet not conclusive. An influential paper by Hall (1988) finds that
this parameter is close to zero, and the subsequent literature has also pro-
vided further support for values smaller than one23, although Hall’s results
have sometimes been challenged on methodological grounds.24 Moreover,
some studies suggest that heterogeneity across agents is an important factor
for the EIS estimation.25 As an attempt to explore estimation differences
across countries and methodologies, Havránek et al. (2015) have collected
2,735 estimates of EIS reported in 169 studies. From meta-analysis meth-
ods, they find a mean estimate around 0.5, and typically lying between 0 and
1. Among six countries for which more than 50 estimates exist, the mean
EIS is 0.9 for Japan, 0.6 for the US, 0.5 for the UK, 0.4 for Canada, 0.2
for Israel, and 0.1 for Sweden. While their results suggest that the type of
utility function does not affect the reported estimates of the EIS in a system-
atic way, the cross-country differences are important, yet essentially below
unity. Households in countries with higher income per capita and higher
stock market participation show larger values of the elasticity.
The fact that the EIS is higher for countries with high stock market par-
ticipation is important for asset pricing models. Indeed, the disaster risk
literature relies on the assumption that EIS is larger than one in order to
23See for instance Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Ludvigson (1999), Yogo (2004).
24Bansal and Yaron (2004) argue that ignoring time-varying consumption volatility leads
to a downward bias in the macro estimates of the EIS, but Beeler and Campbell (2012)
question the extent of the bias.
25Blundell et al. (1994) and Attanasio and Browning (1995) find that rich households
tend to show a larger EIS. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) find a
larger EIS for stockholders than for non-stockholders. Bayoumi (1993) finds that liquidity-
constrained households show a smaller EIS.
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reproduce the key asset pricing behavior (Nakamura et al., 2013). In par-
ticular, a high value of EIS is important to prevent the risk-free rate from
declining too much following the disaster risk. However, in a recent em-
pirical estimation of Wachter (2013)’s time-varying disaster risk framework,
Irarrazabal and Parra-Alvarez (2015) find that a low EIS is consistent with
appropriate levels of the equity premium and volatility of government bonds,
while an EIS greater than one can generate higher price-dividend volatility
and stock market volatility, and hence a lower Sharpe Ratio.
In asset pricing models, an EIS larger than 1 reduces the precautionary
saving effect and hence limits the decline in risk-free rate and the counter-
intuitive increase in asset prices. Nevertheless, we show here that, when the
model features sticky prices, the decrease in the risk free rate following a
disaster risk shock is smaller with an EIS smaller than one. The New Key-
nesian framework thus plays a crucial role in determining the effect of the
EIS on macroeconomic dynamics and asset pricing variables.
5.3 Preference shocks
As disaster risk is captured by a shift in preferences, our effects resemble
those from exogenous shocks to the discount rate.
The asset pricing literature argues that supply-driven shocks alone cannot
account for the observed movements in asset prices and thus points out the
needs for considering shocks to ‘preference shocks’ (Campbell and Ammer
(1993), Cochrane (2011)). More generally, by changing the demand for as-
sets, preference shocks have been sucessful in matching the equity premium,
the bond term premium, and the weak correlation between stock returns and
fundamentals by generating a good fit for risk-free rate variations indepen-
dently of cash flows (see for instance the early work of Campbell (1986) and
recent papers by Schorfheide et al. (2014) and Albuquerque et al. (2015)).
However, these models, just as Gourio (2012), generally consider a nega-
tive shock to the discount factor, i.e an increase in agents’ impatience: they
suddenly want to consume more and hold fewer assets. On the contrary, the
New Keynesian literature generally studies the effects of positive preference
shocks, i.e a decrease in agents’ patience. This has also been successful in
some respects, in particular lately in making the zero lower bound (ZLB)
for policy interest rate binding (see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Eg-
gerston et al. (2014), and Erceg and Linde (2012)). An increase in the
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discount factor decreases agents’ propensity to consume and puts downward
pressure on real factor prices, real marginal cost and inflation. The real
interest rate must diminish to reduce deflationary pressures. Empirically,
variance decomposition shows that positive preference shocks is one of the
main determinants of the nominal interest rate (Smets and Wouters (2003)
and Ireland (2004)).
One of our contributions here is to conciliate the asset pricing partial
equilibrium effects of a negative preference shock, by considering the exact
same mechanism as in Gourio (2012), with the general equilibrium effects
obtained with exogenous preference shocks in the New Keynesian literature.
This is far from trivial as both literatures have found a recession and an
increase in risk premia (or flight-to-quality) to be associated with opposite
movements in the discount factor. Yet, we show here that Gourio’s definition
of the disaster risk can give responses compatible with the predictions for
exogenous positive preference shocks whenever an EIS below unity and sticky
prices are adopted. In line with the ZLB literature, we find that preference
shifts lower interest rates on bonds, cause deflation and recession.26
5.4 Uncertainty shocks
Another class of shocks related to ours is changes in aggregate uncertainty,
or second-moment shocks. The shock we consider here affects the level of the
probability of disaster. However, its effects are very similar to a volatility
shock, and can be understood as a potential source of it.27 Bloom (2009)
finds that an increase in uncertainty generates an immediate drop in output,
as well as in labor and productivity as firms wait before hiring and reallo-
cation from low to high productivity firms is impeded. In the medium term
26The only apparent difference with Christiano et al. (2011) concerns the response
of investment. Given that capital accumulation is included in our model, a decrease
in the real interest rate drives investment up following the shock. In a model extension,
Christiano et al. (2011) also considers capital accumulation but because the ZLB prevents
the nominal interest rate from declining following a preference shock, and deflation arrives,
the real interest rate increases, such that investment naturally cannot rise. Our model
does not impose such a constraint but it would be straightforward to do so. In that case,
a fall in investment would deepen the recessionary effects of disaster risk.
27Baker and Bloom (2013) use rare events, such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks,
political coups d’état and revolutions to instrument for changes in the level and volatility of
stock-market returns. They argue that some shocks, like natural disasters, lead primarily
to a change in stock-market levels (first-moment shocks), while other shocks like coups
d’état lead mainly to changes in stock-market volatility (second-moment shocks).
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however, the economy bounces back as firms address their pent-up demand
for labor and capital. With this respect, a disaster risk shock has a similar
effect to uncertainty shock as it produces a short sharp recession followed by
an “overshooting” in the recovery.
As for the response of investment, Saltari and Ticchi (2007) show that,
when the EIS is low, higher uncertainty is associated with an increase in
investment even if the risk aversion is high. This effect holds for a disaster
risk shock in our model. In the same vein, Bansal and Yaron (2004) show
that an increase in uncertainty increases precautionary savings and dimin-
ishes output in the short run. In the long run however, an increase in savings
can have positive impact on output via an increase in investment. Unlike
an open-economy setting, where excess savings translates into holdings of
foreign assets rather than domestic investment, Fernández-Villaverde et al.
(2011a) show that an increase in uncertainty makes investment go up in a
closed-economy version. Yet output goes down because sticky prices pre-
venting an immediate adjustment. The same intuition holds in our model.
Finally, a related but slightly separated literature has considered ‘disas-
ters’ as rare events stemming from non-Gaussian shock distributions. Cúrdia
et al. (2014) and Chib and Ramamurthy (2014) show evidence that mod-
els with a multivariate t-distributed shock structure are favored by the data
over standard Gaussian models. Auray et al (2012) show that limiting dis-
tributions of several aggregate macroeconomic time series, such as GDP, real
wages and capital stock, exhibit fat tails if the returns to scale episodically
increase. Andreasen (2012) studies rare disasters and uncertainty shocks,
through skewed shock distributions, affect risk premia in a DSGE model.
Weitzman (2012) also examines the effects of nonnormalities and rare dis-
asters on risk premia. He finds that, with a higher probability weight on
very bad outcomes, tail fattening reduces the magnitude of equity premium
and riskfree rate puzzles. Finally, Wachter (2013) analyzes the effects of
a time-varying probability of a consumption disaster and assumes that the
conditional distribution of consumption growth becomes highly non-normal
when a disaster is relatively likely.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a New Keynesian model featuring a small but
time-varying probability of rare events à la Gourio (2012). The purpose
was twofold. First, we aimed at conciliating the recessionary effects of an
unexpected rise in disaster risk with a standard value of the elasticity of in-
tertemporal of substitution. Indeed, we have first shown that Gourio (2012)’s
flexible-price results hold if and only if the EIS is above unity. However, we
then argued that the presence of sticky prices provides a solution by making
the response of output primarily impacted by the response of consumption,
instead of savings in real business cycle models.
Second, we aimed at conciliating the macroeconomic effects of the disas-
ter risk with the preference shock literature. Indeed, under Gourio (2012)’s
assumptions, the disaster risk is equivalent to a shift in the discount fac-
tor. However, recession is associated with agents becoming more impatient
in Gourio (2012) but positive shocks to an exogenous discount factor, and
thus agents becoming more patient in the New Keynesian literature (Smets
and Wouters (2003), Christiano et al. (2011)). Here, we showed that Gou-
rio (2012)’s model actually drives the agents to be more patient whenever
the EIS is below unity. In that case and when combined with sticky prices,
we can yet obtain a decrease in consumption, wage, and output, as well as
deflation, and an increase in risk premia all together.
This model could easily be used for further research. In particular, it
would be interesting to look at the optimal policies to be implement in the
face of increased disaster risk. Also, it would be informative to study varia-
tions in the term premium due to the disaster risk, and how the short-term
risk premium interacts with the long-term yield curve. The impact of uncon-
ventional monetary policies would then be particularly worth investigating.
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7 Appendices
A Households’ problem with disaster risk
A.1 Capital accumulation with disaster risk
Let us consider that the law of motion for capital is
Kt+1 =
[
(1− δ0u
η
t )Kt + S
(
It
Kt
)
Kt
]
ext+1 ln(1−∆)
where the depreciation rate of capital given by
δt = δ0u
η
t (10)
with u the utilization rate of capital and η a parameter, where S(.) is a
capital adjustment cost function featuring the usual properties as given by
S
(
It
Kt
)
=
It
Kt
−
τ
2
(
It
Kt
−
I¯
K¯
)2
(11)
and where the last term expresses that capital accumulation is affected by
the occurrence of a “disaster” captured by the indicator variable xt+1. Specif-
ically, if a disaster occurs, we have xt+1 = 1, with a time-varying probability
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denoted θt, a fraction 1 − ∆ of capital is destroyed. Otherwise, xt+1 = 0,
and the law of motion is standard.
Following Gourio (2012)’s spirit, we assume that productivity is subject
to the same disaster risk and follows
zt+1
zt
= eµ+εz,t+1+xt+1 ln(1−∆)
This allows to write a law of motion for the detrended capital stock as
kt+1 =
(1− δt)kt + S
(
it
kt
)
kt
eµ+εz,t+1
(12)
where lower case letters denote the detrended variables (kt = Kt/zt, etc).
This way, the disaster event itself xt+1 does not affect the detrended capital,
while the disaster risk θt will however do (indirectly).
A.2 Bonds with disaster risk and the budget constraint
In addition, households can also buy one-period bonds issued by a public
authority. These assets are also subject to the same disaster risk , i.e
Bt+1 = [Bt(1 + rt−1)]e
xt+1 ln(1−∆)
or, reexpressed in detrended terms as bt+1 =
bt(1+rt−1)
eµ+εz,t+1
. The households’
(detrended) budget constraint is thus given by
wt
pt
Lt +
bt(1 + rt−1)
pt
+
P kt
pt
utkt +
Dt
zt
= it + ct +
bt+1
pt
eµ+εz,t+1 +
Tt
zt
(13)
where w stands for the (detrended) nominal wage rate, p the good price, P k
the (nominal) rental rate of capital received from the firms, D the monopo-
listic firms’ real profits, T lump-sum taxes.
A.3 Epstein-Zin preferences under disaster risk
Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences are given by:
V˜t =
[
[Ct (1− Lt)
̟]1−ψ + β0
(
EtV˜
1−γ
t+1
) 1−ψ
1−γ
] 1
1−ψ
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By setting V˜t = V
1
1−ψ
t and χ = 1−
1−γ
1−ψ , we obtain
Vt = [Ct (1− Lt)
̟]1−ψ + β0
(
EtV
1−χ
t+1
) 1
1−χ
and finally defining vt ≡
Vt
z1−ψt
, we get
vt = [ct(1− Lt)
̟]1−ψ +
β0
z1−ψt
(
Et
(
z1−ψt+1 vt+1
)1−χ) 11−χ
with ct = Ct/zt stands for the detrended consumption. Since we have as-
sumed that productivity evolves as zt+1/zt = e
µ+εz,t+1+xt+1 ln(1−∆), we can
rewrite the previous equation as
vt = [ct(1− Lt)
̟]1−ψ+
β0
z1−ψt
(
Et
(
z
(1−ψ)
t e
[µ+εz,t+1+xt+1 ln(1−∆)](1−ψ)vt+1
)1−χ) 11−χ
= [ct(1− Lt)
̟]1−ψ + β0
(
Ete
[µ+εz,t+1+xt+1 ln(1−∆)](1−ψ)(1−χ)v1−χt+1
) 1
1−χ
that can further be decomposed, in Gourio (2012)’s spirit, as
vt = [ct(1− Lt)
̟]1−ψ+β0Et
[
e(1−γ)xt+1 ln(1−∆)
] 11−χ
e(1−ψ)µEt
[
e(1−γ)εz,t+1v1−χt+1
] 1
1−χ
with (1− γ) = (1− ψ)(1 − χ) from earlier definition. Then, since there is a
disaster (x = 1) with probability θ and no disaster (x = 0) with probability
(1− θ), we can decompose in the expression above the term
β0Et
[
e(1−γ)xt+1 ln(1−∆)
] 11−χ
= β0
[
(1− θt) + θte
(1−γ) ln(1−∆)
] 1
1−χ
where the first expectation operator is conditional on the disaster risk and
information at time t whereas the second expectation operator is only con-
ditional on information at time t.
Thus, redefining the discount factor as a function of the (time-varying)
disaster risk (à la Gourio, 2012) as
β(θ) ≡ β0
[
1− θt + θte
(1−γ) ln(1−∆)
] 1
1−χ
(14)
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our objective function can finally be rewritten as
vt = [ct(1− Lt)
̟]1−ψ + β(θt)e
(1−ψ)µ
[
Ete
(1−γ)εz,t+1v1−χt+1
] 1
1−χ
(15)
A.4 Solving for the household’s problem
Households want to maximize (5) subject to (1)-(4) and (6). The Lagrangien
for this problem can be written as
L = [ct(1− Lt)
̟]1−ψ + β(θt)e
µ(1−ψ)
(
Ete
εz,t+1(1−γ)v
(1−χ)
t+1
) 1
1−χ
+EtΛ
B
t
(
wnomt
pt
Lt −
bt+1
pt
eµ+εz,t+1 +
bt(1 + rt−1)
pt
+
P kt
pt
utkt +
Dt
zt
− it − ct −
Tt
zt
)
+ EtΛ
C
t
[
(1− δ0u
η
t )kt + S
(
it
kt
)
kt − kt+1e
µ+εz,t+1
]
with δt = δ0u
η
t and S
(
it
kt
)
= itkt −
τ
2
(
it
kt
− i¯
k¯
)2
, and where ΛBt and Λ
C
t are
the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the budget constraint and capital
accumulation constraint respectively. The first-order conditions are thus
(ct :) (1− ψ)c
−ψ
t (1− Lt)
̟(1−ψ) = ΛBt
(ct+1 :) Et

β(θt)e(1−ψ)µ e(1−γ)εz,t+1v−χt+1(
Ete(1−γ)εz,t+1v
1−χ
t+1
) −χ
1−χ
(1 − ψ)c−ψt+1 (1− Lt+1)
̟(1−ψ)

 = EtΛBt+1
(Lt :)
1− Lt
ct
=
̟
wt
(bt+1 :) Λ
B
t e
µ+εz,t+1 = Et
(
ΛBt+1
1 + rt
1 + πt+1
)
(kt+1 :) Et
{
ΛBt+1
P kt+1
pt+1
ut+1 + Λ
C
t+1
[
1− δ0u
η
t+1 + τ
it+1
kt+1
(
it+1
kt+1
−
i¯
k¯
)
−
τ
2
(
it+1
kt+1
−
i¯
k¯
)2]}
= ΛCt e
µ+εz,t+1
(ut :) Λ
B
t
P kt
pt
= ΛCt δ0ηu
η−1
t
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(it :) Λ
B
t = Λ
C
t
[
1− τ
(
it
kt
−
i¯
k¯
)]
Finally, substituting out the Lagrange multipliers, we get the optimality
conditions expressed in detrended terms.
A.5 The stochastic discount factor
The stochastic discount factor is defined as
Qt,t+1 =
∂V˜t/∂Ct+1
∂V˜t/∂Ct
and, recalling that V˜t = V
1
1−ψ
t and χ = 1−
1−γ
1−ψ , we get
Qt,t+1 = β0
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
−ψ (1− Lt+1
1− Lt
)̟(1−ψ) V −χt+1
(EtV
1−χ
t+1 )
−χ
1−χ
Then, to further express it as a function of the detrended variables, let us
use vt ≡
Vt
z1−ψt
and the expression above to get
Qt,t+1 =
zt
zt+1
(
ct+1
ct
)
−ψ (1− Lt+1
1− Lt
)̟(1−ψ)
β(θt)e
(1−ψ)µ e
(1−γ)εz,t+1v−χt+1[
Ete(1−γ)εz,t+1v
1−χ
t+1
] −χ
1−χ
Note that we cannot use this expression as such for using the perturbation
methods since the term ztzt+1 still contain the disaster variable x. However,
recall the first-order condition on bonds as
EtΛ
B
t+1
ΛBt
= eµ+εz,t+1
Et(1 + πt+1)
1 + rt
= Et

β(θt)e(1−ψ)µ e(1−γ)εz,t+1v−χt+1(
Ete(1−γ)εz,t+1v
1−χ
t+1
) −χ
1−χ
(
ct+1
ct
)
−ψ (1− Lt+1
1− Lt
)̟(1−ψ)
Finally, ‘detrending’ the Lagrange multipliers, λBt ≡
ΛBt
zt
, we get an equilib-
rium condition as
Qt,t+1 =
zt
zt+1
ΛBt+1
ΛBt
=
λBt+1
λBt
, or
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Q˜t,t+1 ≡ Qt,t+1
zt+1
zt
=
ΛBt+1
ΛBt
= eµ+εz,t+1
1 + πt+1
1 + rt
(16)
A.6 The risk premium
The standard asset pricing orthogonality condition reads as
Et
[
Qt,t+1R
i
t+1
]
= 1
where Ri is the real return on asset i. Thus, the riskfree rate, Rf , is
Et
[
Qt,t+1R
f
t+1
]
= 1
Moreover, from the first-order condition on bonds, we know that
Et
[
Q˜t,t+1
]
= Et
[
Qt,t+1
zt+1
zt
]
= Et
[
eµ+εz,t+1
1 + πt+1
1 + rt
]
such that the (real) rate of return on capital can be written as
Rk,realt+1 =
zt+1
zt
1
eµ+εz,t+1
1 + rt
1 + πt+1
= ext+1 ln(1−∆)
1 + rt
1 + πt+1
Further replaced into the (non detrended) condition on capital, we get
Rk,realt+1 = e
xt+1 ln(1−∆)
{
P kt+1
pt+1
ut+1
qt
+
qt+1
qt
[
1− δ0u
η
t+1 + τ
it+1
kt+1
(
it+1
kt+1
−
i¯
k¯
)
−
τ
2
(
it+1
kt+1
−
i¯
k¯
)2]}
Finally, the risk premium is defined in gross terms as the ratio of the real re-
turn on capital to the riskfree rate, i.e Et(Premiumt+1) ≡ Et(R
k,real
t+1 /R
f
t+1).
A.7 The role of the EIS on households’ decisions
A.7.1 The response of the discount factor to the disaster risk
The EIS is given by the following combination of parameters in our model
EIS =
1
1− (1 +̟)(1− ψ)
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so that the time-varying discount factor (6) can be rewritten as
β(θ) = β0
[
1− θt
(
1− e(1−γ) ln(1−∆)
)] 1−1/EIS
(1−γ)(1+̟)
Taking the derivate with respect to the probability of disaster gives
∂β(θ)
∂θ
= β0
1− 1/EIS
(1 − γ)(1 +̟)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
[
e(1−γ) ln(1−∆) − 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
[
1− θt
(
1− e(1−γ) ln(1−∆)
)] 1−1/EIS
(1−γ)(1+̟)−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
The sign of this expression crucially depends on the value of the EIS. Given
̟ > 0, ∆ > 0, θ > 0, β0 > 0, we have:
• With EIS < 1 and γ > 1, A>0, B>0, C>0, so ∂β(θ)∂θ > 0;
• With EIS < 1 and 0 ≤ γ < 1, A<0, B<0, C>0, so ∂β(θ)∂θ > 0;
• With EIS > 1 and γ > 1, A<0, B>0, C>0, so ∂β(θ)∂θ < 0;
• With EIS > 1 and 0 ≤ γ < 1, A>0, B<0, C>0, so ∂β(θ)∂θ < 0;
• With limEIS→1
∂β(θ)
∂θ → 0.
Overall, an increase in the probability of disaster thus makes agents more
patient (higher β(θ)) when the EIS is below unity, and inversely, more im-
patient (lower β(θ)) when the EIS is above unity. This holds for all degrees
of risk aversion (all values of γ), including risk neutrality.
A.7.2 The response of the riskfree rate to the disaster risk (along
the balanced growth path)
Along the balanced growth path, the riskfree rate is given by
Rf =
[
1− θ
(
1− e(1−γ) ln(1−∆)
)]̟(1−γ)+1/EIS−γ
(1+̟)(1−γ)
β0e
−µ
̟+1/EIS
1+̟
[
1− θ
(
1− e−γ ln(1−∆)
)]
The derivative ∂Rf/∂θ is always negative, i.e the riskfree rate decreases in
the disaster risk for all values of the EIS and risk aversion. However, the
magnitude of the slump is sensitive to the value of the EIS: the riskfree rate
decreases more with the disaster risk for an EIS below unity than for an EIS
above unity, given the degree of risk aversion (including risk neutrality). For
instance, with the baseline calibration we find
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• With EIS = 0.5 and γ = 3.8, ∂R
f
∂θ ≈ −0.666;
• With EIS = 2 and γ = 3.8, ∂R
f
∂θ ≈ −0.504;
• With EIS = 0.5 and γ = 0.5, ∂R
f
∂θ ≈ −0.324;
• With EIS = 2 and γ = 0.5, ∂R
f
∂θ ≈ −0.217;
• With EIS = 0.5 and γ = 0, ∂R
f
∂θ ≈ −0.291;
• With EIS = 2 and γ = 0, ∂R
f
∂θ ≈ −0.190
Note again that this is not a general equilibrium effect.
A.7.3 The response of the return on capital to the disaster risk
(along the balanced growth path)
Along the balanced growth path, the return on capital is given by
Rk =
1− θ
(
1− eln(1−∆)
)
β0e
−µ̟+1/EIS
1+̟
[
1− θ
(
1− e(1−γ) ln(1−∆)
)] 1−1/EIS
(1−γ)(1+̟)
The derivative ∂Rk/∂θ is also always negative, i.e the rate of return on
capital decreases in the disaster risk. However, just as for the riskfree rate,
the decrease is larger when the EIS is below unity (rather than above), for
all values of risk aversion (including risk neutrality). For instance, we have
• With EIS = 0.5 and γ = 3.8, ∂R
k
∂θ ≈ −0.332;
• With EIS = 2 and γ = 3.8, ∂R
k
∂θ ≈ −0.169;
• With EIS = 0.5 and γ = 0.5, ∂R
k
∂θ ≈ −0.295;
• With EIS = 2 and γ = 0.5, ∂R
k
∂θ ≈ −0.188;
• With EIS = 0.5 and γ = 0, ∂R
k
∂θ ≈ −0.291;
• With EIS = 2 and γ = 0, ∂R
k
∂θ ≈ −0.190
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A.7.4 The response of the risk premium to the disaster risk (along
the balanced growth path)
Finally, along the balanced growth path, the risk premium is given by
Premium =
[
1− θ
(
1− eln(1−∆)
)] [
1− θ
(
1− e−γ ln(1−∆)
)]
1− θ
(
1− e(1−γ) ln(1−∆)
)
The derivative, calculated under our calibration values, gives
• With γ = 3.8, ∂E(R
k)/Rf
∂θ ≈ 0.333;
• With γ = 0.5, ∂E(R
k)/Rf
∂θ ≈ 0.029;
• With γ = 0, ∂E(R
k)/Rf
∂θ = 0.
The risk premium reacts positively to the disaster risk, and the larger the
risk aversion the larger its magnitude. It does not directly depend on the
value of the EIS along the balanced growth path, in line with Gourio (2012).
However, in general equilibrium, the EIS plays a qualitative role: the larger
the EIS, the smaller the risk premium in response to the disaster risk shock
(see the impulse response functions, comparing Figures 1 and 2 (flexible
prices) on one hand, and Figures 3 and 4 (sticky prices) on the other hand).
B Firms’ problem
B.1 Production aggregation
The aggregate of intermediate goods is given by
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
ν−1
ν
j,t dj
) ν
ν−1
so that the representative firm in the final sector maximizes profits as
max
Yt,j
pt
(∫ 1
0
Y
ν−1
ν
j,t dj
) ν
ν−1
−
∫ 1
0
pj,tYj,tdj
The first-order condition with respect to Yt,j yields a downward sloping de-
mand curve for each intermediate good j as
Yj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)
−ν
Yt
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The nominal value of the final good is the sum of prices times quantities of
intermediates
ptYt =
∫ 1
0
pj,tYj,tdj
in which Yt is substituted to give the aggregate price index as
pt =
(∫ 1
0
p1−νj,t dj
) 1
1−ν
B.2 Cost minimization
Firms are price-takers in the input markets, facing (non-detrended) nominal
wage W nomt and capital rental rate P
k
t . They choose the optimal quantities
of labor and capital given the input prices and subject to the restriction of
producing at least as much as the intermediate good is demanded at the
given price. The intra-temporal problem is thus
min
Lj,t,K˜j,t
WtLj,t + P
k
t K˜j,t
s.t. K˜αj,t(ztLj,t)
1−α ≥
(
pj,t
pt
)
−ν
Yt
The (detrended) first-order conditions are
(Lj,t :) wt = mc
nom
j,t (1− α)
(
k˜j,t
Lj,t
)α
(K˜j,t :) P
k
t = mc
nom
j,t α
(
k˜j,t
Lj,t
)α−1
in which the Lagrange multiplier denoted mcnomj,t can be interpreted as the
(nominal) marginal cost associated with an additional unit of capital or labor.
Rearranging gives the optimal capital over labor ratio as(
k˜j,t
Lj,t
)
∗
=
wt
P kt
α
(1− α)
in which none of the terms on the right hand side depends on j, and thus
holds for all firms in equilibrium, i.e., k˜tLt =
k˜j,t
Lj,t
. Replacing in one of the
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first-order conditions above gives
mcnom∗t =
(
P kt
α
)α(
wt
1− α
)1−α
Reexpressing in real terms mc∗t = mc
nom∗
t /pt, we finally have
mc∗t =
(
P k,realt
α
)α(
wrealt
1− α
)1−α
where P k,real and wreal are the real capital rental rate and (detrended) wage.
B.3 Profit maximization
Let us now consider the pricing problem of a firm that gets to update its
price in period t and wants to maximize the present discounted value of
future profits. The (nominal) profit flows read as
pj,tYj,t −WtLj,t − P
k
j,tK˜j,t = (pj,t −mc
nom
t )Yj,t
which can be reexpressed in real terms as
pj,t
pt
Yj,t − mc
∗
tYj,t. These profit
flows are discounted by both the stochastic discount factor, Qt,t+s, and by
the probability ζs that a price chosen at time t is still in effect at time s.
Finally, given Yj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)
−ν
Yt, the maximization problem is thus
max
pj,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζ)sQt+s
((
pj,t
pt+s
)1−ν
Yt+s −mc
∗
t+s
(
pj,t
pt+s
)
−ν
Yt+s
)
which can be further simplified, using mc∗t =
mcnomt
pt
and factorizing, as
max
pj,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζ)sQt+sp
ν−1
t+s Yt+s
(
p1−νj,t −mc
nom
t p
−ν
j,t
)
The first-order condition is then
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζ)sQt+sp
ν−1
t+s Yt+s
(
(1− ν)p−νj,t + ν mc
nom
t p
−ν−1
j,t
)
= 0
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which simplifies as
p∗j,t =
ν
ν − 1
Et
∑
∞
s=0 (ζ)
sQt+sp
ν
t+sYt+smc
∗
t+s∑
∞
s=0 (ζ)
sQt+sp
ν−1
t+s Yt+s
Note that this optimal price depends on aggregate variables only, so that
p∗t = p
∗
j,t. Expressed as a ratio over the current price, we thus have
p∗t
pt
=
ν
ν − 1
Et
∑
∞
s=0 (ζ)
sQt+s
(
pt+s
pt
)ν
Yt+smc
∗
t+s∑
∞
s=0 (ζ)
sQt+s
(
pt+s
pt
)ν−1
Yt+s
which can be written recursively as
p∗t
pt
=
ν
ν − 1
Et
Ξ1t
Ξ2t
with
Ξ1t = Ytmc
∗
t + ζEtQt,t+1
(
pt+1
pt
)ν
Ξ1t+1
Ξ2t = Yt + ζEtQt,t+1
(
pt+1
pt
)ν−1
Ξ2t+1
Replacing Qt,t+1 ≡ Q˜t,t+1
zt
zt+1
, and detrending, these are simplified as
Ξ˜1t = ytmc
∗
t + ζEtQ˜t,t+1
(
pt+1
pt
)ν
Ξ˜1t+1 (17)
Ξ˜2t = yt + ζEtQ˜t,t+1
(
pt+1
pt
)ν−1
Ξ˜2t+1 (18)
where Ξ˜t ≡ Ξt/zt, the detrended variable.
C Aggregation
C.1 Bonds market
Market-clearing requires that the public debt equals the quantity of bonds
at each time, Debtt = Bt, and is thus symmetrically affected by disasters.
Moreover, we assume that the public budget has to be balanced every period,
i.e the sum of tax revenues and new debt insuance to equal the current debt
50
insuance to be repaid with interest rates (as for the non-disaster part), i.e
Ttpt +Bt+1 = [Bt(1 + rt−1)]e
xt+1 ln(1−∆)
or, in detrended terms,
Tt
zt
+
bt+1
pt
=
bt(1 + rt−1)
pteµ+εz,t+1
C.2 Aggregate demand
Replacing the tax level above into the household’s budget constraint gives
ct+it+
(
bt(1 + rt−1)
pteµ+εz,t+1
−
bt+1
pt
)
= wrealt Lt+
(
bt(1 + rt−1)
pteµ+εz,t+1
−
bt+1
pt
)
+P k,realt utkt+
Dt
zt
which just simplifies as
ct + it = w
real
t Lt + P
k,real
t k˜t +
Dt
zt
i.e, in non-detrended terms, as
Ct + It = W
real
t Lt + P
k,real
t K˜t +Dt
where we now have to verify that the RHS is equal to Yt. Total dividends
(or profits) Dt must be equal to the sum of dividends (or profits) from
intermediate good firms, i.e
Dt =
∫ 1
0
Dj,tdj
The (real) dividends (or profits) from intermediate good firms j are given by
Dj,t =
pj,t
pt
Yj,t −W
real
t Lj,t − P
k,real
t K˜j,t
Substituting Yj,t, we have
Dj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)1−ν
Yt −W
real
t Lj,t − P
k,real
t K˜j,t
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Therefore, knowing that Dt(real) =
∫ 1
0 Dj,t(real)dj, we get
Dt =
∫ 1
0
((
pj,t
pt
)1−ν
Yt −W
real
t Lj,t − P
k,real
t K˜j,t
)
dj =
∫ 1
0
(
pj,t
pt
)1−ν
Ytdj
−
∫ 1
0
W realt Lj,tdj −
∫ 1
0
P k,realt K˜j,tdj
Dt =
∫ 1
0
((
pj,t
pt
)1−ν
Yt −W
real
t Lj,t − P
k,real
t K˜j,t
)
dj = Yt
1
p1−νt
∫ 1
0
(pj,t)
1−ν
dj
−W realt
∫ 1
0
Lj,tdj − P
k,real
t
∫ 1
0
K˜j,tdj
Given that (i) the aggregate price level is p1−νt =
∫ 1
0 p
1−ν
j,t dj, (ii) aggregate
labor demand must equal supply, i.e
∫ 1
0 Lj,tdj = Lt, and (iii) aggregate
supply of capital services must equal demand
∫ 1
0 K˜j,tdj = K˜t, the aggregate
(real) dividend (or profit) is
Dt = Yt −W
real
t Lt − P
k,real
t K˜t
Replaced into the household’s budget constraint, this finally gives the aggre-
gate accounting identity as
Yt = Ct + It
or in detrended terms
yt = ct + it
C.3 Inflation
Firms have a probability 1− ζ of getting to update their price each period.
Since there are an infinite number of firms, there is also the exact fraction
1− ζ of total firms who adjust their prices and the fraction ζ who stay with
the previous period price. Moreover, since there is a random sampling from
the entire distribution of firm prices, the distribution of any subset of firm
prices is similar to the entire distribution. Therefore, the aggregate price
index, p1−νt =
∫ 1
0 p
1−ν
j,t dj, is rewritten as
p1−νt =
∫ 1−ζ
0
p∗1−νt dj +
∫ 1
1−ζ
p1−νj,t−1dj
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which simplifies as
p1−νt = (1− ζ)p
∗1−ν
t + ζp
1−ν
t−1
Let us divide both sides of the equation by p1−νt−1(
pt
pt−1
)1−ν
= (1− ζ)
(
p∗t
pt−1
)1−ν
+ ζ
(
pt−1
pt−1
)1−ν
and define the gross inflation rate as
1 + πt ≡
pt
pt−1
and the gross reset inflation rate as
1 + π∗t ≡
p∗t
pt−1
we get
(1 + πt)
1−ν = (1− ζ)(1 + π∗t )
1−ν + ζ
Finally, since we know that
p∗t
pt
=
ν
ν − 1
Et
Ξ1t
Ξ2t
we have the reset inflation rate as
(1 + π∗t ) = (1 + πt)
ν
ν − 1
Et
Ξ1t
Ξ2t
with the expressions given previously for Ξ1 and Ξ2 (see Appendix B.3), or
equivalently with the detrended terms as
(1 + π∗t ) = (1 + πt)
ν
ν − 1
Et
Ξ˜1t
Ξ˜2t
C.4 Aggregate supply
We know that the demand to individual firm j is given by
Yj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)
−ν
Yt
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and that firm j hires labor and capital in the same proportion than the ag-
gregate capital to labor ratio (common factor markets). Hence, substituting
in the production function for the intermediate good j we get(
K˜t
ztLt
)α
ztLj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)
−ν
Yt
which can be rewritten with detrended variables as(
k˜t
Lt
)α
Lj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)
−ν
yt
Then, summing up across the intermediate firms gives(
k˜t
Lt
)α ∫ 1
0
Lj,tdj = yt
∫ 1
0
(
pj,t
pt
)
−ν
dj
Given that aggregate labor demand and supply must equal, i.e
∫ 1
0 Lj,tdj = Lt,
we have ∫ 1
0
(
pj,t
pt
)
−ν
djyt = k˜
α
t L
1−α
t
Thus, the aggregate production function can be written as
yt =
k˜αt L
1−α
t
Ωt
where Ωt =
∫ 1
0
(
pj,t
pt
)
−ν
dj measures a distortion introduced by the dispersion
in relative prices.28 In order to express Ωt in aggregate terms, let decompose
it according to the Calvo pricing assumption again, so that
Ωt =
∫ 1
0
(
pj,t
pt
)
−ν
dj = pνt
∫ 1
0
p−νj,t
pνt
∫ 1
0
p−νj,t = p
ν
t
(∫ 1−ζ
0
p∗−νt dj +
∫ 1
1−ζ
p−νj,t−1dj
)
pνt
∫ 1
0
p−νj,t = p
ν
t (1− ζ)p
∗−ν
t + p
ν
t
∫ 1
1−ζ
p−νj,t−1dj
28This distortion is not the one associated with the monopoly power of firms but an
additional one that arises from the relative price fluctuations due to prie stickiness.
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pνt
∫ 1
0
p−νj,t = (1− ζ)
(
p∗t
pt
)
−ν
+ pνt
∫ 1
1−ζ
p−νj,t−1dj
pνt
∫ 1
0
p−νj,t = (1− ζ)
(
p∗t
pt−1
)
−ν (pt−1
pt
)
−ν
+ pνt
∫ 1
1−ζ
p−νj,t−1dj
pνt
∫ 1
0
p−νj,t = (1− ζ)(1 + π
∗
t )
−ν(1 + πt)
ν + p−νt−1p
ν
t
∫ 1
1−ζ
(
pj,t−1
pt−1
)
−ν
dj
Given random sampling and the fact that there is a continuum of firms
Ωt = (1− ζ)(1 + π
∗
t )
−ν(1 + πt)
ν + ζ(1 + πt)
νΩt−1
D Full set of equilibrium conditions
Households’ optimality conditions:
Q˜t,t+1 =
(
ct+1
ct
)
−ψ (1− Lt+1
1− Lt
)̟(1−ψ)
β(θt)e
(1−ψ)µ e
(1−γ)εz,t+1v−χt+1
Et
[
e(1−γ)εz,t+1v1−χt+1
] −χ
1−χ
(19)
1− Lt
ct
=
̟
wrealt
(20)
Et[1 + πt+1]
1 + rt
eµ+εz,t+1 = EtQ˜t,t+1 (21)
EtQ˜t,t+1P
k,real
t+1
{
ut+1 +
1
δ0ηu
η−1
t+1
[
1− δ0u
η
t+1 + τ
it+1
kt+1
(
it+1
kt+1
−
i¯
k¯
)
−
τ
2
(
it+1
kt+1
−
i¯
k¯
)2]}
=
P k,realt
δ0ηu
η−1
t
eµ+εz,t+1 (22)
δ0ηu
η−1
t
P k,realt
= 1− τ
(
it
kt
−
i¯
k¯
)
(23)
Households’ constraints
vt = [ct(1− Lt)
̟]1−ψ + β(θt)e
(1−ψ)µEt
[
e(1−ψ)(1−χ)εz,t+1v1−χt+1
] 1
1−χ
(24)
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kt+1 =
(1− δt)kt + S
(
it
kt
)
kt
eµ+εz,t+1
(25)
Processus for the disaster risk
log θt = (1− ρθ) log θ¯ + ρθ log θt−1 + σθ,tεθt (26)
Time-varying discount factor
β(θ) = β0
[
1− θt + θte
(1−γ) ln(1−∆)
] 1
1−χ
(27)
Tobin’s q
qt =
1
1− τ
(
it
kt
− i¯
k¯
) (28)
Asset pricing
EtQt,t+1 =
Et(1 + πt+1)
1 + rt
1
1− θt∆
(29)
Et
[
Qt,t+1R
f
t+1
]
= 1 (30)
EtR
k,real
t+1 = (1− θt∆)
1 + rt
Et(1 + πt+1)
(31)
Et(Premiumt+1) =
EtR
k,real
t+1
Rft+1
(32)
Firms’ constraints
yt =
k˜αL1−αt
Ωt
(33)
k˜t = utkt (34)
wrealt = mc
∗ (1− α)
(
k˜t
Lt
)α
(35)
P k,realt = mc
∗α
(
k˜t
Lt
)α−1
(36)
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(1 + π∗t ) = (1 + πt)
ν
ν − 1
Et
Ξ˜1t
Ξ˜2t
(37)
Ξ˜1t = ytmc
∗
t + ζEtQ˜t,t+1Ξ˜1t+1 (1 + πt+1)
ν (38)
Ξ˜2t = yt + ζEtQ˜t,t+1Ξ˜2t+1 (1 + πt+1)
ν−1 (39)
Price distorsion:
Ωt = (1− ζ)(1 + π
∗
t )
−ν(1 + πt)
ν + ζ(1 + πt)
νΩt−1 (40)
Price index:
(1 + πt)
1−ν = (1− ζ)(1 + π∗t )
1−ν + ζ (41)
Taylor rule:
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr) [Φπ(πt − π¯) + ΦY (yt − y
∗) + r∗] (42)
Aggregate resource constraint:
yt = ct + it (43)
This is a system of 25 equations in 25 unknowns:
{
y, c, i, L, k, k˜, u, β, q, θ, wreal,
P k,real, Q˜,Q,Rk,real, Rf , P remium,Ω, π, π∗, Ξ˜1, Ξ˜2,mc
∗, v, r
}
. We solve for
the steady-state and then use Dynare to simulate the responses to the disas-
ter risk shock with a third-order approximation (unless otherwise specified).
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Figure 5: Responses (in percentage change) to a rise in θ from 0.9% to 1%,
with a first-order approximation, comparing Gourio’s calibration (ζ = 0 and
EIS = 2) and our baseline calibration (ζ = 0.8 and EIS = 0.5).
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Figure 6: Responses (in percentage change) to a rise in θ from 0.9% to 1%,
with a third-order approximation, comparing Gourio’s calibration (ζ = 0
and EIS = 2) and our baseline calibration(ζ = 0.8 and EIS = 0.5).
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Figure 7: Responses (in percentage change) to a rise in θ from 0.9% to 1%
(baseline calibration, third-order), for alternative levels of parameters.
• Risk aversion coefficient, γ
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• Discount factor in the absence of disaster risk, β0
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• Steady-state probability of disaster, θ¯
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• Size of disaster, ∆
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• Persistence of disaster probability, ρθ
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Figure 8: Responses (in percentage change) to a 1% change in the nominal
interest rate on bonds (baseline calibration)
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